

Electoral Coordination and Double Simultaneous
Vote in the Sub-national Level of Uruguay
(1971-2020) *†

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†Note: Replication files are publicly available on: github.com/Fedeayl/Dep_ElectoralCoordinationUY.

Abstract

The 1996 electoral reform made departmental elections independent from national elections in Uruguay and configured traditional first-past-the-post systems at the sub-national level. Yet, they preserved a voting mechanism called Double Simultaneous Vote that is crucial for the dynamic of the contest. This article proposes an adaptation of the classic theory of electoral coordination, considering the effects of that mechanism. Specifically, it argues that the upper limit of effective candidates in the system is four, which is twice the upper limit of a traditional majoritarian electoral system. This argument is tested using data for Uruguay during the 1971 to 2020 period.

Keywords: Double Simultaneous Vote; Electoral Coordination; Sub-national, Uruguay.

1 Introduction

Political scientists have analyzed the relationship between electoral rules and political systems for over a century. However, it was not until the publication of Maurice Duverger's seminal work that a consensus within the discipline emerged (Riker, 1982). According to Duverger (1959), simple-majority single-ballot systems lead to two-party systems, while simple-majority systems with proportional representation and runoff elections result in multi-party systems. Two mechanisms lead to the outcomes mentioned above. First, there is a mechanical factor that transforms votes into seats. Second, there is a psychological factor that influences how voters and parties behave, allowing them to predict the consequences of such rules (Benoit, 2006).

The mechanisms mentioned earlier have been empirically tested multiple times and even adapted to diverse contexts. Notably, seeking to formalize the electoral coordination phenomenon Gary Cox (1997) developed a model based on voters' rational behavior. Specifically, Cox states that if politicians and voters coordinate successfully, the expected equilibrium will be reached at $M+1$ candidates obtaining votes, being M the number of disputed seats. Cox and others have considered a large number of intervening variables and different kinds of electoral systems. Nevertheless, few works have considered the particular combination of electoral rules at the Uruguayan sub-national level.

This work aims to contribute to the literature on electoral coordination by analyzing a very particular case in terms of the combination of electoral rules: the Uruguayan sub-national electoral system, which has a unique design. Specifically, the electoral rules at the sub-national level in Uruguay use a simple-majority system where the main seat in contention is the Mayor. Yet, to enable competition of more than one candidate per political party, it also uses a Double Simultaneous Vote –DSV (hereafter)–. The DSV allows voters to choose their preferred candidate and party on the same ballot. In other words, the election's winner is the most-voted candidate of the most-voted political party. The DSV mechanism was used for decades in the Uruguayan electoral system, but the

1996 electoral reform restricted its application. Since then, the Mayor has been the only executive position elected through DSV. The 1996 reform also altered the concurrence of the elections. It made sub-national elections non-concurrent and partially separated them. In doing so, it allowed for electoral coordination in local elections and potential strategic voters' behavior.

I argue here that DSV rules affect the number of viable candidates. Specifically, I suggest that by allowing intra-party competition, DSV electoral rules increase the number of candidates that compete in a given election. Yet, the number never reaches the maximum permitted by law because such rules allow candidates and/or parties to coordinate successfully at the local level. I test the main hypotheses using data from all elections in Uruguay from 1971 to 2020. The main theoretical prediction is supported by results obtained from various statistical models. Results remain robust to different specifications of the model.

This article is organized as follows. The first section describes the characteristics that make the Uruguayan sub-national electoral system comparatively unique. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on electoral coordination, emphasizing the studies that deal with the Uruguayan case. Further, I present an adaptation of the classic models of electoral coordination to the DSV mechanism. Section 3 explains the methodological design and presents the variables and main hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the results. The conclusion is presented in section 5.

2 The sub-national Uruguayan electoral system

Since the Constitution of 1830 was drafted, at least two levels of government have existed in Uruguay: the national and the sub-national level (*departamentos*), adding a third one, the municipal level, more recently in 2010. Successive constitutional reforms altered the composition of sub-national governments. Specifically, they alternated between single-member and collegiate executives and modified the number of seats in the legislatures. The 1967 Constitution later established a single-member executive chief - called *Intendente* - and a 31-member legislative branch - named *Junta Departamental* -.

Since then, elections have been carried out through closed and blocked lists, defining the winner by a simple majority and applying the DSV mechanism.

The electoral reform of 1996 unquestionably altered some characteristics of the electoral process. First, it established a ten-month-long electoral cycle that starts with primary elections and ends with sub-national ones. In primary elections, each party elects a single candidate for Presidency, a National Deliberative Body - which designates the Vice-Presidency candidate - and a sub-national Deliberative Body - which appoints a maximum of three candidates running for Mayor -.

Secondly, national and sub-national elections are not concurrent anymore. Before the 1996 reform, elections did not only take place at the same time but were also strongly linked to each other because voters were not allowed to vote for different political parties across different levels of government. After the reform, sub-national elections became more relevant since they were not subordinated to electoral competition at the national level (Cardarello, 2011), which increased the discretion of sub-national political actors. Since then, these actors have been able to have strategies that they consider most convenient at the departmental level (Vairo, 2008), including the possibility of coordinating electorally. However, primary elections maintain the link between the elections of the same electoral cycle. Bottinelli (1999, cited in López 2007) called this rule the Anti-Secession Clause, which works by preventing candidates who participate in one election under the label of a party from joining a list of another party in the same electoral cycle. This rule hinders the creation of exclusively sub-national parties (López, 2007).

We can thus define the existing departmental electoral system in Uruguay as follows: departmental elections take place six months after national elections; people vote with closed and blocked lists; the main position in dispute is the Mayor, who is elected by simple majority rule; up to three candidates per political party can run for Mayor; a legislative body is conformed with an automatic majority for the winning party and the remaining seats distributed by D'Hondt method. A very particular addition is the DSV mechanism. With a single ballot, citizens vote in the first place for their preferred

political party and in second place for their favorite candidate within that party. The winner of the departmental election is the most-voted candidate of the most-voted party. As such, the DSV enables a level of internal competition within political parties that affects both the composition of the electoral offer and the behavior of voters.

3 Electoral coordination with DSV

According to Cox (2000), electoral coordination refers to the different processes by which voters and politicians coordinate their electoral actions to obtain more seats in the legislative or positions in the executive branch. The effectiveness of coordination processes entails a reduction in the number of competitors or, in other words, inefficient coordination makes it more likely that a minority candidate will win. On the other hand, at the same time that the viable candidates in the elections are reduced, so is the set of policies that can potentially be carried out (Cox, 1997). Therefore, representative democracy has coordination problems at its core.

Since the seminal contributions of Duverger (1959), who linked the types of electoral systems to the number of parties, political scientists have refined the analysis and formalized its propositions. Notably, Reed (1990), studying Japanese elections, identified two mechanisms that affect the number of competing parties: strategic voting and coalition formation by elites. These two effects lie in different parts of the political process. On one side, coalition formation responds to strategic coordination of electoral supply; on the other, strategic vote is the product of coordination of voters to minimize the probability that a less-preferred option triumphs over a more liked one. Reed (1990) proposed an equilibrium at $n+1$ candidates, where n is the number of seats in dispute in the electoral district.

Several works have already linked the Uruguayan electoral system with its party system. For example, González (1990) argues that the design of the Uruguayan electoral system produces a high and growing fractionalization of the party system. These findings were supported by Mieres (1996), Vernazza (1989), and Monestier (1999). However,

Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes (1998) disputed these conclusions. Using the Effective Number of Party Fractions, they argued that the fractionalization of the Uruguayan party system is moderate and has remained stable over time. More recently, framing his work in the electoral coordination literature, Piñeiro supported these conclusions by studying the election of deputies (Piñeiro, 2004) and the election of deputies and senators according to the electoral size of the parties (Piñeiro, 2007). Furthermore, regarding legislative elections, Levin and Katz (2011) studied the relation between the strategic behavior of Uruguayan electoral supply and demand and the size of electoral constituencies.

This article differs from previous studies by placing the analysis at the sub-national electoral level. Studies of the sub-national electoral level in Uruguay are not new. For example, Moraes (1997) analyzed the unusual characteristic of the automatic majority for Departmental Boards; Cardarello (2011) considered the re-election of the Mayor, while Cardarello, Freigedo, and Cisneros (2015) emphasized the unrelated nature of the elections and the consistency of the results. The work of Buquet, Cardarello, and Schmidt (2018) is likewise noteworthy, as they compile and present the analysis of a large number of indicators on the effects of the electoral system at the municipal level, ranging from electoral participation to the re-election of mayors, passing by the fragmentation of the system and the volatility of the elections. Strictly related to the electoral coordination process, Buquet and Piñeiro (2015) proposed a pseudo-experimental design to test Duverger's Law by comparing both levels' electoral results.

I argue here that, to understand better the strategic behavior of political actors at the sub-national level in Uruguay, it is essential to build on the theoretical and formal development of Cox (1997), whose book *Making Votes Count* marked a turning point in the literature on electoral coordination. Cox assumes that actors are rational: they have consistent preferences, maximize their expected utility, make decisions based on calculation or strategic reasoning of costs and benefits, and are self-interested (Eriksson, 2011). In Cox's model, there are n voters with ordered and transitive preferences about K candidates who run for an election with M disputed seats. Following Palfrey (1989), Cox

(1997) determines that there are two possible types of equilibrium both in single-member and multi-member districts: a Duvergerian Equilibrium with $M+1$ parties receiving votes, and a non-Duvergerian Equilibrium, with more than $M+1$ parties receiving votes, what can happen when there are two or more parties with almost identical expected voting.

Cox (1997) distinguishes two moments in electoral coordination: the coordination of the supply side of the electoral market or strategic entry; and the coordination of the demand side or strategic vote. The electoral supply is adjusted before voting takes place. If politicians coordinate effectively, up to $M+1$ candidates will run for election, leaving no room for strategic voting. Thus, if politicians are primarily concerned with the current election, and it is clear who the viable candidates are, coordination on the supply side will be easy and result in $M+1$ candidates competing for a seat (Cox, 1997). However, this does not always happen. First of all, according to Cox (1997), the prospects of politicians can exceed the current election, and they might compete knowing the improbability of their victory but foreseeing future benefits. Secondly, the presence of established party labels in the electoral running confers advantages to those who appear under them, affecting expectations about the viability of candidacies. These elements hinder achieving the $M+1$ equilibrium from the supply-side coordination.

At Uruguay's sub-national level, the electoral design adds a layer of complexity to the competition by adding an intra-party-level dispute to the traditional competition among parties. Thus, some considerations are in order. The 1996 electoral reform determined that the Mayor is the most relevant position in competition in the sub-national elections, so this dispute defines the dynamics of the competition, no matter that there are other positions to be filled (Cardarello, 2011). However, this simplicity is nuanced since each party can present up to 3 candidates under its label. In these cases, there the DSV mechanism determines the winner among them. The following question arises: what is the impact of the DSV on electoral coordination processes?

At the Uruguayan sub-national level, there is a simple-majority system where the most relevant position in dispute is Mayor. Following the literature, since the magnitude

of the district is one ($M=1$), considering the strategic calculation of elites and voters, the expected Duvergerian equilibrium is in two parties ($M+1=2$) (Cox, 1997). However, there is also a second simultaneous competition stage, the intra-party level. It is reasonable to expect that the reductive effect of electoral coordination might be attenuated because of the DSV. This dynamic can intuitively be narrated as follows.


On the supply side, each party has incentives to present more than one candidate to accumulate more votes; they can postulate up to three Mayor candidates each. Given that a higher number of candidates is not detrimental to their electoral chances, that would be the optimal strategy in the first instance. On the demand side, voters first decide to cast their vote for a particular party and then for a candidate within that party. Once they choose the party, they must select one of the three candidates presented under its label. If the same complete and transitive preferences and the certainty about votes distribution among parties that Cox (1997) assumed can be transferred to the candidacies level, voters will know the viability of each candidacy. Possible voters of the third candidate in descending order of votes will abandon their first option and support the most preferred one of the remaining two candidates, who still have a chance of winning the election inside that party. Because the third-place candidate anticipates being a victim of strategic voting, he will withdraw. Therefore, DSV and intra-party competition tend to increase the expected number of candidates without reaching the maximum established by the regulations.

As such, since at the inter-party competition stage $M=1$, two parties will compete for the Major seat, or the voters will concentrate on at most two of them. Simultaneously, in the intra-party competition, M equals 1 for each party. Here, a candidate competes to win the election within the party. If this candidate's party wins the election, he/she will become the new Mayor. So, there is an upper bound at $(M+1) + (M+1) = 2(M+1)$ ¹.

¹This approach is almost identical to the one made by (Piñeiro, 2004). In some sense, it is also similar to what (Cox, 1997) expected for a double-round system. He predicted an equilibrium in three candidates for the first round instead of the expected two of a simple-majority one. (Buquet, 2003) defined the DSV mechanism as a simultaneous primary election because two competition instances are occurring at the same time. So, having DSV, a higher upper limit of candidates compared to a traditional majoritarian system can be expected.

For the sub-national Uruguayan level, the expected upper bound is $2(1+1) = 4$ viable candidates. The following figure illustrates the process. In summary, the DSV determines the electoral coordination process at the sub-national Uruguayan level. Compared to a traditional majoritarian system, it doubles the number of viable candidates.

Figure 1: **Electoral coordination with DSV**



Source: own elaboration.

4 Method, variables and hypotheses

I use a quantitative research design to test the main hypotheses. The data was extracted from the Uruguayan Electoral Court and, for elections before 2010, from the Electoral Encyclopedia of Uruguay by Bottinelli, Giménez, and Marius (2010). The dataset has 171 observations: 19 units of analysis reporting information for 9 points in time (time-series-cross-section data). This data structure allows the application of linear panel data regression models, which have certain advantages over traditional multiple linear regression. Panel data models consider unobservable heterogeneity among units without specifying dichotomous variables, identifying effects that OLS models cannot

detect (Perazzi & Merli, 2013). Since all the individual observations are present in the panel, I estimate the models with fixed effects by sub-national unit (Montero, 2011) and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The dependent variable is the Effective Number of Candidates (ENC)², as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Electoral coordination has its counterpart in the number of candidates who receive votes in an election. Effective coordination implies a lower fragmentation of the political system and vice versa, ineffective electoral coordination results in a higher number of candidates in which votes are concentrated and, therefore, a higher fragmentation. The Effective Number is the standard solution to the party counting problem (Cox, 1999). Compared to the total number of candidates, it has the advantage of being less susceptible to testimonial options.

The main independent variable is the set of electoral rules applied at each moment, before and after the reform. It is measured with a dichotomous variable, *Rule*, which acquires the value "0" for the elections carried out under the old electoral rules and "1" for those elections after the 1996 reform. Considering the expected theoretical Duvergerian equilibrium, as has been formerly developed, the following hypotheses arise:

H1a: Compared to the rules in force before the 1996 Reform, the configuration of rules after it results in a lower ENC

H1b: With the set of rules resulting from the electoral reform, and considering the effect of the DSV, the vote will concentrate in, at most, four candidates

I also consider a few additional independent variables that previous literature has reported as relevant to coordination processes. Firstly, Jones (1999) documented that

²The Effective Number of Candidates was computed with the formula: $ENC = 1/\sum_{i=1}^n V_i^2$ being V_i the proportion of votes obtained by the party i in the current election. The ENP varies between 1 and N ; it is equal to 1 when only one party concentrates all the votes, and it is equal to N when all the N parties obtained the same quantity of votes.

the presence of an incumbent in the electoral competition in presidential systems has a reductive effect on the number of candidates. Cardarello (2011) has considered this point for the Uruguayan sub-national level. Here, a dichotomous variable, *Incumbent*, was created, where the value "1" reflects the presence of an incumbent in that election and "0" represents its absence

H2: The presence of an incumbent reduces the ENC

Further, some scholars have analyzed the importance of electoral market stability for the supply side of the coordination processes Luján (2017). The appropriate indicator to measure the stability of voters' preferences is electoral volatility, calculated according to Pedersen's index (Pedersen, 1979)³. In this case, two electoral events occur in the same electoral cycle: departmental and national elections. The indicator was calculated in two ways: intra-cyclical volatility *IntraVolat*, and inter-cyclical electoral volatility *InterVolat*. The first variable refers to the total net variation of votes among parties between the departmental and the national election. The second one is similar but considers only sub-national elections of one cycle and the immediately preceding one.

H3: Higher levels of electoral volatility leads to a higher ENC

Moreover, much of the literature on electoral coordination considers that the incentives for strategic voting arise as competitiveness increases; in other words, when the probability that a vote to be decisive is greater (Cox, 1997). However, some authors have reported an inverse association between these variables (Fisher, 2000; Myatt, 2002). Electoral surveys are not available for most of the period studied here, which represents a difficulty in estimating the perception of voters and candidates about the degree of competitiveness of the election. Considering the importance of past events as information input for rational-instrumental actors such as those considered here (Blossfeld, 1996)

³The formula used to calculate the electoral volatility is the following: $V_t = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}|$ where $p_{i,t}$ is the proportion of votes obtained by the party i in the election t , and $p_{i,t-1}$ is the proportion of votes obtained by the same party in the immediately prior election

and following the proposal of Sartori (1976) about classifying party systems, the variable *Competitive* reflects the historical perception of the dynamics of competition. The dichotomous variable *Competitive* acquires the value "1" when more than one party has occupied the government in the last three periods of government. When the alternation of parties in government has not happened, the variable acquires the value "0".

H4: A competitive system leads to a lower ENC

The final model to be estimated has the following specification:

$$ENC_i = \alpha_i + \beta_1 Rule_{it} + \beta_2 Incumbent_{it} + \beta_3 InterVotal_{it} + \beta_4 IntraVolat_{it} + \beta_5 Competitive_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$


The following section presents, first, a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable, which will be functional to show the behavior of the ENC over time. Then, an inferential analysis contrasts the hypotheses already stated⁴.

⁴Apart from the already mentioned variables, there are some other characteristics of political systems that electoral coordination studies have also studied. For instance, district magnitude (Cox & Shugart, 1996), ethno-linguistic heterogeneity (Amorin Neto & Cox, 1997; Singer & Stephenson, 2009), and ideological polarization (Luján, 2017). In this work, these variables were not considered. First of all, district magnitude is equal to one in all the cases. Secondly, in Uruguay there is not substantial levels of social heterogeneity along the territory. Thirdly, this work assumes the ideological polarization as a constant along the territory. Finally, sub-national and socio-demographic data is not available for the whole period, so its variation along time and units could not have been taken into account (Cox, 1997).

5 Results and discussion

Figure 2 shows the behavior of the system's ENC during the period under study. Each point corresponds to a sub-national election. Additionally, a boxplot summarizes the distribution for each year. The thicker dashed line indicates the theoretically predicted limit of four candidates. The reduction of the ENC has been notorious since the 2000 elections. Before the 1996 electoral reform, the period's average ENC was 5.57, with a standard deviation of 1.4. After these changes, the average stood at 3.65, while the standard deviation decreased by almost half. Table 1 summarizes the distributions of the pre-reform and post-reform rule configurations.

Figure 2: **Total effective number of candidates (1971-2020)**



Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: **Descriptive statistics - Effective number of candidates (1971-2020)**

	Post 1996 reform rules	Pre 1996 reform rules
Minimum	3,26	2,01
Mean	5,57	3,65
Median	5,36	3,64
Std. deviation	1,4	0,77
Maximum	10,42	5,37

Source: own elaboration.


So far, I have only presented data at the system level, leaving the party level unexplained -the second channel of simultaneous competition enabled by the DSV and the second instance of coordination of politicians and voters.- Recall that the expected Duvergerian equilibrium is at four effective candidates at the system level and two effective candidates for each party. Figure 2 shows the indicator disaggregated at the party level. The height of the columns represents the average ENC for the 19 departments in each electoral year; the bars indicate the standard deviation.

In the case of Broad Front, the single-candidate strategy was almost unaltered until 2005, although it then varied and reached a maximum near three effective candidates. National Party's case is the opposite. Before the reform, the competition was among many candidates, reaching a maximum of almost five effective candidates; after the reform, it decreased to less than two in most cases. Something similar happened within Colorado Party. Before the electoral reform, the elections when two or fewer candidates concentrated the votes were exceptional, but later 1996, it became the norm. However, it should be noticed that sometimes the coordination was ineffective, with the ENC being close to 3. This reduction in the ENC does not only respond to the mechanical effect of the legal upper limit of candidacies. While this limit is three candidates, an ENC close to this level has been reached only in a few cases. In most elections, the political actors coordinated effectively, either on the supply side or the demand side. During the 95 elections observed by each political party - 19 elections in 5 electoral periods - a number

higher than two effective candidates was measured only in 25 opportunities for the Broad Front, 11 for the National Party, and 8 for the Colorado Party. Overall, this is effective coordination at the party level 84% of the time.

The reduction in fragmentation also occurs at the system level. This work stated that considering the effects of the DSV, the upper bound of expected effective candidates for the system is 4, and it happened in most electoral events. The average ENC measured after the reform was 3.65. In total, the coordination was effective - the ENC was fewer than four - in 65 electoral events out of 95. Additionally, there are eight cases in which the ENC was slightly higher than the predicted one but smaller than 4.2. However, for 24 observations the ENC was higher than 4.2, so there were coordination failures.

Figure 3: **Effective number of candidates per party (1971-2020)**



Source: own elaboration.

The following statistical models further test the aforementioned hypotheses. Model 1, for instance, includes only the variable Rule, which corresponds to the main hypothesis of the work. Model 2 also considers the variable Incumbent, and Model 3 adds both volatility variables. Model 4 adds the variable Competitive. Finally, Model 5 contains all the considered variables ⁵.

Table 2: **Statistical models. Effective number of candidates**

DV: effective number of candidates (ENC)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Rule</i>	-1.92 *** (0.23)	-1.90 *** (0.22)	-1.85 *** (0.26)	-1.89 *** (0.22)	-0.22 *** (0.04)
<i>Incumbent</i>		-0.37 ** (0.14)	-0.38 ** (0.14)	-0.37** (0.14)	-0.39** (0.14)
<i>InterVolat</i>			-0.06* (0.02)		-0.06 * (0.02)
<i>IntraVolat</i>			-0.27 (0.36)		-0.28 (0.36)
<i>Competitive</i>				0.011 (0.25)	-0.017 (0.26)
N. Obs.	171	171	171	171	171
R2	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49
Adj R2	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.41

Note: *p<0,05; **p<0,01; ***p<0,001. Note: (Std.Dev)

All models report the variable Rule as statistically significant at 99.9% and with a negative association, rejecting the null hypothesis. It enables us to affirm that, according

⁵The analysis was made using the R Programming environment. Statistical models were performed with the package *plm* (Millo, 2017).Graphics were made using the package *ggplot2* (Wickham, 2016).

to the conformation of these models, the new set of rules has a statistically significant impact on reducing the effective number of candidates. Depending on the models, the new rules set reduced between 1.92 and 1.85 effective candidates on average compared to the pre-reform one, holding other variables constant.

The Incumbent variable is also reported with a negative direction and statistically significant at 99% in Models 2, 3, 4, and 5, thus supporting the hypothesis that the presence of an incumbent has a reducing effect on the Effective Number of Candidates. In models 3 and 5, which consider the two volatility variables, only the inter-cyclical volatility was reported statistically significant at 95%; against what was expected, it showed a negative relationship with the dependent variable, implying that higher electoral volatility would facilitate coordination. Finally, the variable Competitive has not been reported as statistically significant in any model, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this case. The sequential addition of the different variables did not represent considerable variations in the coefficient of multiple determination R^2 . While the first model, which contains only the Reform variable, explains 47% of the variability of the response variable, this value grows to 49% in Model 2 and remains unchanged in the following ones.

6 Conclusions

The 1996 electoral reform de-linked national elections from departmental elections. This variation allows me to analyze the differences between two electoral contexts with different rule configurations. Before the reform, politicians' strategy was subordinated to the national competition since several arenas were simultaneously contested: presidential, legislative, and sub-national. After the reform, the main competition is for the position of mayor under a traditional first-past-the-post electoral system. Nevertheless, the predictability in actors' behavior and coordination processes that a simple majority system implies happens to be altered by the peculiar mechanism of Double Simultaneous Voting (DSV).

This paper builds on the theory of electoral coordination to the particularities of a double simultaneous vote mechanism. The main theoretical proposition suggests that the DSV altered the expected equilibrium of two candidates of a traditional majoritarian system, increasing to four candidates receiving votes at the system level and two at the party level. The empirical test of these formulation results in the formerly mentioned equilibrium has been fulfilled in most cases.

Additionally, the central hypothesis of this work, which implies that the new set of electoral rules is decisive in reducing the Effective Number of Candidates, is empirically sustained in all the statistical models presented. It stands out the relevance of the design of the electoral system in structuring the political competition in terms of electoral coordination. All of the models presented have also reported the incumbent's presence has a reductive effect on system fragmentation. Nonetheless, levels of electoral competition have not shown empirically verifiable effects in the coordination process. Finally, the relationship between fragmentation and electoral volatility yields less clear results and opens doors for future work on this topic.

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